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Abstract In this paper, we use a series of simple examples to illustrate how wealth-
driven selection works in a market for Arrow securities. Our analysis delivers both
a good and a bad message. The good message is that, when traders invest constant
fractions of their wealth in each asset and have equal consumption rates, markets
are informationally efficient: the best informed agent is rewarded and asset prices
eventually reflect this information. However, and this is the bad message, when asset
demands are not constant fractions of wealth but dependent upon prices, markets
might behave sub-optimally. In this case, asymptotic prices depend on preferences
and beliefs of the whole ecology of traders and do not, in general, reflect the best
available information. We show that the key difference between the two cases lies in
the local, i.e. price dependent, versus global nature of wealth-driven selection.
Keywords Market selection · Evolutionary Finance · Informational efficiency ·
Asset pricing · CRRA preferences
JEL Classifications D50 · D80 · G11 · G12
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to illustrate, using simple examples, the good, the bad, and
the unknown about wealth-driven selection in asset markets. For this purpose, we
consider the simplest setting in which the problem can be investigated, a repeated
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market for two Arrow securities. Each asset represents a different way to transfer
current wealth to future consumption or re-investment. Whereas aggregate wealth
is fixed ex-ante and depends only on the realized state of Nature, prevailing asset
prices and the distribution of wealth among agents are endogenously determined
and depend also on agents’ investment decisions. Even in our stylized framework,
whether the market is capable of rewarding the best informed agents or, more in
general, the nature of the of lung-run prices and wealth distributions is still an
open issue.
Despite this lack of knowledge, most models in economics and finance postu-
late the ability of markets to select for agents whose equilibrium prices reflect the
correct, or the best available, information about asset fundamentals. They assume
so in much more complex settings than the one analyzed here. The underlying idea
is that agents who have inferior information would lose wealth over time in favor
of the better informed. If this were true, the market would converge to a long-
run equilibrium in which the best informed agent has all wealth and prices would
reflect this information. The market could be said to be informationally efficient,
as it efficiently conveys, through prices, the best available information about asset
fundamentals.
The examples of this paper are meant to illustrate when the above idea is cor-
rect and when, and why, it is not. We show that the class of investment behaviors
considered crucially influences the efficiency of the wealth-driven selection process.
To illustrate the point, we consider investment behaviors or “portfolio rules” derived
from the one period1 maximization of an expected log or power utility, that is, Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences, given relative risk aversion γ and
subjective probabilities about the occurrence of states of Nature. When γ = 1, that
is with log utility, the demand is expressed as a constant fraction of wealth to be
invested in each asset. When γ = 1, that is with power utility, the fraction of wealth
becomes price dependent. We analyze the asymptotic states of our market dynam-
ics and compare results for the two cases. When the fraction of wealth invested in
each asset is constant, the agent whose subjective probabilities are the “closest” to
the true probability distribution of the states of Nature dominates the economy and
takes all the wealth in the long run.2 Since the agent possessing the best information
about the fundamental process is rewarded by the market, prices are set to reveal this
information. This is the “good” side of selection in asset markets.
On the other hand, when portfolio rules are price dependent, long-run prices do
not need to represent the best available information. In general, it is not possible
to judge ex-ante who will be rewarded by the market and to what extent the latter
will be able to reveal the correct information about asset fundamentals. In fact, it
is easy to construct examples in which prices exhibit endogenous fluctuations and
1Since we are primarily interested in analyzing the selective capability of markets, we assume that agents
are myopic and drop the assumption of perfect foresight or rational-expectations. These assumptions
would indeed sterilize the effect of the trading-induced wealth reallocation, as all the problems would be
reduced to an ex-ante identification of possible equilibria.
2As we shall see, the appropriate quantification of the “distance” between probability distributions is
provided by the relative entropy.
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never converge or, depending on initial conditions and realizations of states of Nature,
reveal the worst available information. This is the “bad” side of selection in asset
markets. Interestingly, the failure to select the best informed agents can be related to
analogous issues pointed out in Nelson and Winter (2002) within the firm selection
literature, namely: variety, behavioral continuity, limited path dependence, and profit
induced growth. We refer to the same classification at the end of the paper when we
summarize our findings.
Technically, the dynamics of agents wealth and asset prices can be formalized
as a discrete-time random dynamical system. Given agents wealth fractions, portfo-
lio rules, and asset prices at time t , the market dynamics is a random map which
depends on the next realized state of Nature. Different states of Nature give rise
to different reallocation of resources at time t + 1. The newly determined wealth
distribution, together with the updated portfolio rules, possibly changed by the infor-
mation revealed by previous trading, will, in turn, determine the next prices, and
the process is repeated over and over again. The analysis of long run wealth and
price distributions becomes the ultimate object of interest. In Bottazzi and Dindo
(2010) we focus on the analytical investigation of the random dynamical system
representing the market dynamics and are able to derive local stability conditions
of those states in which only one trader has all the wealth. In the present contri-
bution, relying on those results, we discuss selection in asset markets using simple
examples and with the help of a graphical tool, thus avoiding technical proofs.
First, by plotting agents portfolio rules against a normalization of the supply, the
so-called Equilibrium Market Curve (EMC, see Section 4), we find the possible
long-run selection equilibria as the short-run Walrasian equilibria where only one
agent has positive wealth. Second, comparing the distance of each individual rule to
a benchmark rule, the Kelly rule, so-called after Kelly (1956), we discuss the local
stability of single survivor equilibria. This characterization of the long-run dynam-
ics enables us to assess the selective capability of the market and its informational
efficiency.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
introduction to the recent works that have investigated wealth-driven selection in
asset markets. In Section 3, we introduce the asset market model and derive agents’
demand from the (myopic) maximization of a CRRA utility function. In Section 4,
we consider the case of constant portfolio rules, characterize the outcome of the
long-run market dynamics and show how, in this case, the market rewards the best
informed agent. The analysis begs the question of what happens with more general
demand functions. We answer this question in Section 5, where we introduce price
dependence in agents investment decisions. As the examples in Sections 5.1 and 5.2
show, the market selective capability in favor of the best informed agent turns from
working globally to working only locally so that the convergence of prices toward
informationally efficient values is not granted anymore. In Section 6, we show that
the local nature of market selection leads to the impossibility of ordering rules accord-
ing to their mutual survivability. In Section 7, we conclude by linking our findings
with those summarized by Nelson and Winter (2002) for the firm selection liter-
ature, by presenting the open issues, and by setting a possible agenda for future
research.
644 G. Bottazzi, P. Dindo
2 Selection in asset markets
The investigation of the ability of markets to redistribute resources in favor of the
rational and better informed agents started with Blume and Easley (1992) (see also
Blume and Easley 2010). They study the relative wealth dynamics among different
investors repeatedly exchanging Arrow securities in a temporary equilibrium frame-
work. Trading occurs because agents have different beliefs on the likelihood that a
security will pay its dividend and/or different risk preferences. They find that mar-
ket selection works in that there exists an investment rule that dominates against any
other rule and drives asset prices to their correct values. We draw upon this result
in Section 4 where we present the “good” side of selection in asset markets. More
in general, we show that, within portfolio rules that prescribe investing a fixed frac-
tion of wealth in each asset, informational efficiency holds and asset prices converge
as close as possible to their fundamentals. However, Blume and Easley (1992) also
construct examples where, in absence of the global dominating rule, market selec-
tion does not work and leads to asset miss-pricing. We clarify the origin of this form
of inefficiency in Section 5 where we present the “bad” side of selection in asset
markets.
The following literature has tried to generalize the hypothesis under which market
selection does work. Evolutionary Finance (see Evstigneev et al. 2009 for a recent
survey) has focused on more general market structures, while keeping agents behav-
iors in the class of constant rules we analyse in Section 4. Incomplete markets and
generic Markovian processes driving the states of Nature have been studied: Amir
et al. (2005) and Evstigneev et al. (2008) extended the analysis for short and long-
living asset, respectively. Although partly different results have been found with
respect to the global dominating strategy, differences which led to the introduction
of the so-called generalized Kelly rule (see Sections 4 and 5), in all these works it is
confirmed that, as long as the global dominating rule is trading, market informational
efficiency holds.
A different group of works has focused on generalizing the class of rules to
encompass any investment decision explicitly coming from utility maximization, so
that asset demand is not necessarily expressed as a fixed, belief dependent, fraction
of wealth. Assuming perfect foresight on realized prices and market completeness
Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) find that, no matter the functional
form of the utility function they maximize, the agent whose beliefs are “nearest” the
correct ones is selected in the long run. Sandroni (2005) generalizes this result to spe-
cific types of incomplete markets. Although these results have strong implications,
they are based on the very demanding assumption that agents are able to coordinate
on having perfect foresight on realized prices. This assumption does not only imply
that agents are able to coordinate their expectations, but also that they can guess
ex-ante the correct price. In all these works, market informational efficiency is a
by-product of allocative efficiency which, in turns, is granted by the perfect foresight
assumption.
In the context of financial market models with heterogeneous agents, the general
finding is that the interaction of boundedly rational agents may lead, through the link-
ing of past market performances to present returns, to endogenous price fluctuations
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and asset mis-pricing (see Hommes 2006; LeBaron 2006, for a review). In partic-
ular, in our previous work (see e.g. Anufriev et al. 2006; Anufriev and Bottazzi
2010; Anufriev and Dindo 2010) we have studied wealth-driven market selection on
the class of price dependent investment rules in a standard model with a risky and
a risk-free asset. Those works are, however, based on an essentially deterministic
framework and do not discuss the informational efficiency issue we are interested in
here.
The effort to investigate wealth-driven selection in an stochastic framework with
non constant portfolio rules started with our contribution, (Bottazzi and Dindo 2010).
There we take a standard Evolutionary Finance market model with short-lived assets
and add price dependent portfolio rules to the analysis. We find that the comparison of
the relative performance of portfolio rules is only possible at given prices, explaining
way there exist cases in which no rule gains all wealth in the long run or in which
different rules gain all wealth for different initial conditions or different realizations
of the fundamental process. We draw upon this contribution in Sections 5 and 6 where
we present the “bad” consequences of selection in asset markets.
3 The model
Assume that there are 2 possible states of Nature, state 1 and state 2. Their unfolding
in time can be represented by a Bernoulli process ω = (ω1, . . . , ωt , . . .), with ωt ∈
{1, 2} and ωt = 1 with probability π for every t ∈ N. We denote with N+ the set
N ∪ {0}. In order to transfer wealth inter-temporally, and thus being able to consume
in the future, I agents can trade in two short-lived Arrow securities. Asset k = 1, 2,
exchanged in period t at price pk,t , pays one unit of the consumption good in period
t + 1 if ωt+1 = k, and zero otherwise. The consumption good is the numera`ire of
the economy. Each agents’ demand is expressed as a fraction of wealth, that is, the
demand of agent i for asset k at time t is given by αik,twit /pk,t , where α
i
k,t is agent i
invested fraction in asset k in period t , and wit is agent i wealth in period t. We refer
to the vector (αi1,t , α
i
2,t ) as the portfolio, or investment
3
, rule of agent i in period t.
Asset markets open at time 0 and close at an arbitrary large final period T. We
assume that consumption occurs only in this final period. All intermediate wealth
is thus saved and re-invested in assets4. Agent i budget constraint implies that her
portfolio rule obeys to αi1,t + αi2,t = 1 for every t ∈ N+. Moreover we impose that
αik,t ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, for every t ∈ N+, as the agent who violates this constraint will
3Portfolio rules are distinct from investment rules when intermediate consumption is considered, in which
case the portfolio rule specifies the fraction of wealth to be allocated to each asset whereas the investment
rule also specifies the fraction of wealth to be saved and the fraction of wealth to be consumed. See also
footnote 4 below.
4This is equivalent to assuming a constant and homogeneous consumption rate for all agents, bar a renor-
malization of price levels. As discussed in Blume and Easley (1992), the introduction of heterogeneous
consumption rates weakens markets informational efficiency when better informed traders have a higher
propensity to consume. Since the effect is well understood, we have chosen not to consider it in the present
analysis.
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have negative wealth in finite time. Both constraints imply that each agent i period t
investment rule belongs to 2, the unitary simplex of R2.
The price of asset k = 1, 2 in period t, pk,t , is fixed by Walrasian market clearing.
Assuming unitary assets supply, period t market clearing can be written both in terms
of units
1 =
I∑
i=1
αik,t w
i
t
pk,t
, k = 1, 2
or, more conveniently for our purposes, in terms of market values
pk,t =
I∑
i=1
αik,t w
i
t , k = 1, 2 . (1)
At time t + 1, if the event ωt+1 ∈ {1, 2} is realized, the wealth of agent i, wit+1, is
equal to the amount of shares of asset k = ωt+1 bought at time t, or
wit+1 =
αiωt+1,t w
i
t
pωt+1,t
. (2)
By summing up the previous equation over all the I agents and using Eq. 1, it is clear
that, no matter the initial wealth, the total wealth in the economy is then equal to one,
the total assets dividend payment. Since portfolio rules are constrained to add up to
one, this implies that
p1,t + p2,t = 1 for every t ∈ N+ . (3)
The latter equation can be used to normalize prices so that we shall use p1,t = pt
and p2,t = 1 − pt in what follows.
For definiteness and illustrative purposes, in this contribution we restrict our anal-
ysis to the class of investment rules derived from the maximization of the expected
CRRA utility of next period wealth. However, as it will become clear later, the phe-
nomena we discuss have a general character and do not depend in any respect on this
assumption. An agent who assigns the subjective probability πe to the realization of
state 1 and who possesses a relative risk aversion parameter γ derives period t port-
folio rule (α1,t , α2,t ) by maximizing the expected utility of wealth in period t + 1,
that is, using Eq. 2, by solving
argmax(α1,t ,α2,t )∈2
{
πeu
(
α1,twt
pt
)
+ (1 − πe)u
(
α2,twt
1 − pt
)}
,
where u is a log or power utility function
u(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
x1−γ
1−γ if γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞) ,
log(x) if γ = 1 .
(4)
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It is straightforward to get the explicit solution of the maximization problem: when
γ = 1, the portfolio rule depends on pt but not on wt and reads
α1,t = α(pt ;πe, γ ) = (πe(1−pt )1−γ )
1
γ
(πe(1−pt )1−γ )
1
γ +((1−πe)(pt )1−γ )
1
γ
,
α2,t = 1 − α(pt ;πe, γ ) .
(5)
When γ = 1, the previous solution collapses to constant portfolio rule
α1,t = α(pt ;πe, 1) = πe , and α2,t = 1 − α(pt ;πe, 1) = 1 − πe . (6)
We will denote with αi(p;πe, γ ) the portfolio rule of agent i. As we shall see in the
following sections, the analysis of the market dynamics, and especially its asymptotic
characterization, critically depends on the nature of these rules.
4 The good: wealth-driven selection with constant portfolio rules
In this section, we consider the benchmark case of constant portfolio rules, that is,
agents invest constant fractions of their wealth in each asset, irrespectively of their
wealth or assets prices. As shown in the previous section, this rule corresponds to the
maximization of the expected logarithmic utility of next period wealth.5 The fraction
of wealth invested in each asset is equal to the subjective probability of realization of
the associated state of Nature, see Eq. 6.
Consider first the case of a market with a single investor. Let wt be the investor
wealth and α the share of wealth invested in asset 1. We assume that investors assign
a positive probability to both states, so that α ∈ (0, 1). The market dynamics in Eqs.
1 and 2 becomes
wt+1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αwt
pt
if ωt+1 = 1 ,
(1−α)wt
1−pt if ωt+1 = 2 ,
(7)
where the price of the first asset is
pt = α wt . (8)
Substituting Eq. 8 in Eq. 7, it is immediately clear that, by investing a positive amount
in both assets, the trader will secure all future wealth no matter the realization of the
state of Nature. Wealth evolution does not pay any role and pt = α for every t.
We can use a standard supply and demand plot to visualize the market equilibrium
price. In the left panel of Fig. 1 we plot both the supply market value p, and the
demand market value α. Their crossing, E1, fixes the equilibrium price, which in
this case is trivially equal to α. Consistently with our previous works, we name the
diagonal supply curve in this plot the Equilibrium Market Curve (EMC). Indeed,
5Were the reader, for any reason, averse to the expected utility framework, he or she is free to consider
the constant rules as behavioral rules, that is, as mere descriptions of agents behavior. Our results and the
overall analysis remain the same.
648 G. Bottazzi, P. Dindo
Fig. 1 Left Panel: EMC plot representing a market with a single investor using α = 0.4. The only possible
outcome of the dynamics is E1. Right Panel: EMC plot representing a two-agent market. Investment shares
are α1 = 0.4 and α2 = 0.7, respectively. E1 and E2 are the two single survivor long-run equilibria
we shall show that the EMC is the locus of all possible long-run equilibria of our
economy.
In order to study the role of the market in redistributing wealth among agents, and
the ensuing asset price behavior, we need to add a second investor. Let the investment
rules be α1 and α2, respectively. The wealth of agent i = 1, 2 evolves according to
wit+1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αiwit
pt
if ωt+1 = 1 ,
(1−αi)wit
1−pt if ωt+1 = 2 ,
(9)
where the price of the first asset is given by the combination of both rules
pt = α1 w1t + α2 (1 − w1t ) , (10)
and we have used w2t = 1 − w1t . If, in a given period, agent i possesses all the
wealth, then p = αi and agent i will possess all the wealth in all subsequent periods.
If otherwise, both agents have positive wealth, prices are between α1 and α2 and
returns depend on the realization of the state of Nature. Notice that, in each period,
the market rewards the agent with the highest stake in the dividend paying asset.
The right panel of Fig. 1 illustrates a two-agent market using the “EMC plot”.
E1 and E2 are the crossing of agent rules with the EMC. They are deterministic
fixed points of the random dynamical system specified by Eq. 9: no matter the real-
ized states of Nature, the market dynamics starting in E1 (or E2) will stay there for
ever. E1 and E2 are the single survivor equilibria of the market dynamics since they
occur when one agent possesses the entire wealth. The question we want to answer
is whether for generic initial conditions the market will converge toward a single sur-
vivor equilibrium or keep fluctuating between them. For this purpose, we use the
evolution of the wealth ratio. From Eq. 9, knowing that ωt+1 = 1 with probability π ,
one has
w1t+1
w2t+1
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
α1
α2
w1t
w2t
with probability π ,
1−α1
1−α2
w1t
w2t
with probability 1 − π .
(11)
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The wealth of the agent with the highest stake in asset 1, that is, the agent with the
larger belief α (agent 2 in the example in the right panel of Fig. 1), increases with
probability π and decreases with probability 1 − π . In T periods, denoting with T1
the number of times state 1 is realized, one has
w1T
w2T
=
(
α1
α2
)T1 (1 − α1
1 − α2
)T −T1 w10
w20
,
and, taking the log,
log
w1T
w2T
= T1 log α
1
α2
+ (T − T1) log 1 − α
1
1 − α2 + log
w10
w20
.
Since, for the Law of Large Numbers, T1/T → π as T → ∞, one obtains
lim
T →∞
1
T
log
w1T
w2T
=
(
π log
α1
α2
+ (1 − π) log 1 − α
1
1 − α2
)
. (12)
To interpret Eq. 12, notice that the investment rule of each agent can be seen as
a probability measure (α, 1 − α) defined over the states of Nature. Consider now
the relative entropy of this measure with respect the true probabilities (π, 1 − π)
defined as
Iπ (α) = π log π
α
+ (1 − π) log 1 − π
1 − α . (13)
Iπ (α) is always non-negative and is zero if and only if α = π . The relative entropy
is a measure of information loss: the lower its value, the greater the agreement of the
beliefs (α, 1 − α) with the true Bernoulli distribution (π, 1 − π). Substituting the
expression for the relative entropy in Eq. 12, one obtains
lim
T →∞
1
T
log
w1T
w2T
= Iπ (α2) − Iπ (α1) .
If Iπ (α2) > Iπ(α1) the limit is positive, which implies that w2T → 0 as T → ∞.
Agent 1 dominates, that is, gains all the wealth in the long-run. If instead Iπ (α2) <
Iπ(α
1), then w1T → 0 as T → ∞. In this case, agent 2 dominates. We have estab-
lished that the agent whose investment rule or beliefs have the lowest relative entropy
with respect to the process generating the sequence of states of Nature dominates.
At the same time, long-run prices will reflect the best beliefs and will move as close
as possible to the probability distribution (π, 1 − π). In this sense, the market is
informationally efficient.
It is useful to restate this result using the EMC plot. For this purpose, we add
the line π to the two-agent EMC plot in the right panel of Fig. 1 to obtain Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 EMC plot representing a two agents market with π = 1/2, α1 = 0.4, and α2 = 0.7. The two
possible long-run outcomes of the dynamics are S1, where agent 1 dominates, and U2, where agent 2
dominates. Since the line α1 is closer to π than α2, S1 is globally stable and U2 unstable
Notice that the relative entropy of a strategy α is monotonically related to its dis-
tance from the line π . Indeed, the expression in Eq. 13 is monotonically decreasing
in α if α < π and monotonically increasing if α > π . Moreover, when π = 1/2,
as in all the examples of this paper, the function Iπ (α) is symmetric around π , so
that the relative entropy can be directly derived from the Euclidean distance in the
EMC plot.6 Thus, since in Fig. 2 the π line is closer to α1 than to α2, if both agents
start with positive initial wealth, no matter how much in favor of agent 2, agent
1 will gain all wealth in the long run and the price of the first asset converges to
E1. Technically, we have just established that the only (globally) stable equilibrium
is E1.
From the previous discussion it is clear that the best possible constant portfolio
rule, the rule that gains all wealth when trading with (different) constant rules, is the
rule with minimal entropic distance from the process governing the succession of the
states of Nature. The rule prescribes investing a fraction of wealth π in the first asset
and a fraction 1 − π in the second asset. This rule, to invest proportionally to the
probabilities, is named the Kelly rule after Kelly (1956). Although it has its origin
in models with exogenous prices (exogenous odds in the original betting framework,
see e.g. Breiman 1961), it provides the average highest growth rate of wealth also
in our model. According to our analysis, when present in the market, the Kelly rule
beats any other different constant rule and bring prices to the probability revealing
values π and 1−π . In terms of the maximization problem, the Kelly rule corresponds
to an investor possessing correct beliefs about the process governing the state of
6When π = 1/2, one can use the function Iπ (α) to rescale the vertical axis in the EMC plot so that the
entropic distance can be still inferred by visual inspection.
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Nature and having CRRA preferences with unitary relative risk aversion coefficient,
i.e. logarithmic utility, a principle known as log-optimality.7
In the EMC plot, the Kelly rule coincides with the probability line π , so that com-
paring distances with respect to the probability line amounts to comparing distances
with respect to the Kelly rule. Thus, we can restate the global stability results by say-
ing that the rule closest to the Kelly rule is the one that takes all the wealth in the
long-run.
Similar conclusions can be reached in the general case of many assets and many
agents, as originally shown in Blume and Easley (1992) (see also Evstigneev et al.
2009, for a survey of other possible extensions). In all cases, the agent gaining all
wealth in the long-run is the one using the rule with the lowest relative entropy with
respect to the invariant distribution of the dividend generating process. By gaining
all wealth, this agent drives prices toward the single survivor fixed point “closest” to
the probability measure ruling the states of Nature process. In this case, the market
is informationally efficient and prices assets as close as possible to their probability
revealing values. This is not, however, the end of the story.
5 The bad: wealth-driven selection with price dependent portfolio rules
In this section, we investigate market behavior under wealth-driven selection when
agents have values of the relative risk aversion coefficient γ different from one. As is
clear from Eq. 5, this implies that portfolio rules depend on prices. In Fig. 3, different
rules are displayed, both for values of γ close to one (left panel) and far from it (right
panel). The shapes of CRRA portfolio rules are consistent with the notion of risk
aversion. When γ is close to zero, agents are close to being risk-neutral, and choose
to invest all their wealth in the asset with the highest (subjective) expected return,
so that extremal values of α become more likely. On the contrary, more risk adverse
agents tend to split their wealth proportionally to asset prices in order to achieve a
less risky, but smaller, return. In this case the value of α remains closer to the EMC
for a wide price range.
When rules depend on prices, agents’ wealth evolve according to
wit+1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αi(pt )w
i
t
pt
ωt+1 = 1
(1−αi(pt ))wit
1−pt ωt+1 = 2
, i = 1, 2 , (14)
7In some contributions of the Evolutionary Finance literature, the Kelly rule has been replaced by the gen-
eralized Kelly rule, that is, investing proportionally to expected assets payoffs. Despite the fact that the
two rules coincide in a market with only Arrow securities, they differ under more general asset structures.
In particular, the generalized Kelly rule is in general not log-optimal, although it has been shown to dom-
inate among constant rules, see Evstigneev et al. (2009). The relation between the log-optimal Kelly rule
and the generalized Kelly rule is the object of ongoing research. See also Section 5.3 of this paper and
Section 5.1 in Bottazzi and Dindo (2010).
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Fig. 3 Portfolio rules derived by the maximization of a CRRA utility defined in Eq. 5 and 6). Left panel:
values of γ close to 1. Right panel: extremal values of γ
where pt is a solution of the (now implicit) equation
pt = α1(pt )w1t + α2(pt )(1 − w1t ) . (15)
Since αi(p) ≷ p for p ≶ πe,i , as can be shown directly from Eq. 5, the right hand
side of Eq. 15 is greater than pt when pt < min{π1, π2}, while lower than pt when
pt > max{π1, π2}. Being a continuous function, it has at least an intersection with the
supply curve pt in the interval [min{π1, π2}, max{π1, π2}]. Regarding uniqueness,
given the analysis of market dynamics we shall employ in what follows, we need
only to ensure that the equilibrium price where agent 1 or agent 2 has all wealth,
π1 and π2, respectively, are regular, that is, locally unique. The result follows easily
by imposing either w1t = 1 or w1t = 0 in Eq. 15 and using again αi(p) ≷ p for
p ≶ πe,i . Once an equilibrium price is fixed, the evolution of wealth ratios still reads
w1t+1
w2t+1
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
α1(pt )
α2(pt )
w1t
w2t
with probability π ,
1−α1(pt )
1−α2(pt )
w1t
w2t
with probability 1 − π ,
, (16)
but now, due the price dependence of the αs, the value of the ratio w1T /w
2
T after T
time steps depends on the price history. At each time step we can still compute the
expected log-growth rate of the wealth ratio which can be written as the difference of
the relative entropies
E
[
log
w1t+1
w2t+1
− logw
1
t
w2t
]
= π logα
1(pt )
α2(pt )
+ (1 − π) log1 − α
1(pt )
1 − α2(pt )
= Iπ (α2(pt )) − Iπ (α1(pt )) .
The difference depends on prevailing prices, and so does the relative distance from
the Kelly rule, as can be seen in the EMC plot. As a result, there may exist prices
at which rule 1 is nearer to the Kelly rule, thus having the lowest relative entropy
and gaining, on average, wealth shares, and prices at which rule 2 is nearer. Market
selection through entropy minimization operates only locally, that is, for given prices,
rather than globally.
Since the relative performance of rules is price dependent, a global stability anal-
ysis similar to the one done in the previous section is not straightforward. Thus, we
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follow a different approach: we analyze the occurrence of the asymptotic states in
which a single agent dominates. First, we identify the single survivor equilibria at
which all the wealth is in the hands of one agent and prices are accordingly set by the
agent rule. Second, we check whether market dynamics is stable for prices close to
these equilibria.8 For example, in the two agents market dynamics illustrated in the
left panel of Fig. 4, local stability analysis amounts to studying the dynamics in the
neighborhoods of S1, where w1 = 1 and the price of the first asset is p = α1, and of
S2, where w2 = 1 and prices are set by the solution of p = α2(p). The local analysis
provides sufficient insight to discuss the asymptotic behavior of prices and wealth.
In the following sections, we use portfolio rules of the types given in Eqs. 5
and 6 to illustrate the implication of the price dependency for market informational
efficiency. Notice that, no matter the value of γ , all the rules with the same πe cross
the EMC at the same point, that is, p = πe (c.f. rules in Fig 3). As a result, irre-
spectively of their preferences, if agents share the same beliefs about the occurrence
of states of Nature, then assets are priced at that level and all agents have the same
unitary return, and constant wealth. Prices represent the homogeneous beliefs, and
preferences do not matter. As we shall see, the dynamics is more interesting when
agents disagree on the value of π .
5.1 Coexistence of stable long-run market equilibria
For the first example depicted in Fig. 4, left panel, we take π = 1/2, πe,1 =
0.25, γ 1 = 1, πe,2 = 0.65, and γ 2 = 0.5. There exist two single survivor equilibria:
S1, where only agent 1 survives and the price of the first asset is set at p = πe,1, and
S2, where only agent 2 survives and the price of the first asset is set to p = πe,2.
Computing the distances of portfolio rule α1 and α2 from π at the price corre-
sponding to S1 one finds that |α2(πe,1)−1/2| > |πe,1 −1/2| = 1/4. Then for initial
prices near to πe,1 the rule used by agent 1 has a lower relative entropy compared to
the rule used by agent 2 , i.e. Iπ (α2(pt )) > Iπ(α1(pt )). The wealth share of agent
1 will, on average, increase and will eventually converge to one. As a result, if the
market share of the first agent is almost 1, and we imagine forcefully moving a small
fraction of wealth from agent 1 to agent 2, the dynamics of the market will bring the
system back to the situation in which w1 = 1. We have established that S1 is locally
stable.
A symmetric argument holds in S2, where |πe,2 − 1/2| = 3/20 < |πe,1 − 1/2|,
so that agent 2 is closer to the probability line π than agent 1. Then for initial prices
near to πe,2, it is the wealth share of agent 2 that increases, on average, so that rule
8In other words, we shall first identify all the deterministic fixed points of the random dynamical system,
and then perform their local asymptotic stability analysis. The local analysis is made possible by the
fact that in single agent markets the equilibrium price is regular, i.e. locally unique, so that the market
dynamics is well defined. Thus market dynamics can be linearized around the fixed points and agents can
be described as if they were using suitably defined constant rules. As a result, the analysis of asymptotic
states can proceed along the lines of Section 4. For sufficiently smooth investment rules, results from the
linearized markets carry over to the original market, albeit only locally (see Bottazzi and Dindo 2010, for
details).
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Fig. 4 EMC plots representing two-agent markets with price dependent rules. Left panel: π = 1/2,
α1(p) = α(p; 0.25, 1), α2(p) = α(p; 0.65, 0.5). The two possible long-run outcomes of the dynamics
are S1, where agent 1 dominates, and S2, where agent 2 dominates. Both are locally stable. Right panel:
π = 1/2, α1(p) = α(p; 0.25, 2), α2(p) = α(p; 0.65, 1). Both long-run equilibria U1 and U2 are unstable
α2 will eventually dominate. It follows also that S2 is locally stable. We have found
that the market dynamics has two locally stable fixed points, or two possible long-
run equilibria: there exist market trajectories at which the first agent dominates and
asset prices converge to S1, and trajectories at which the second agent dominates and
asset prices converge to S2.
In Fig. 5, we plot the wealth dynamics9 for two different simulations, that is, two
different sequences ω, and the same initial conditions w10 = w20 = 1/2. In the left
panel, despite some initial fluctuations, the second agent dominates in the long-run
and the price of the first asset converges to πe,2. In this case, the market behaves
efficiently, as it rewards the strategy based on the most accurate beliefs. In the right
panel, conversely, it is the first agent who gains all the wealth in the long run. When
the value of p is relatively small, due to the lower risk aversion, agent 2 is more
distant than agent 1 from the probability line, so that the market selects against the
former and the price of the first asset approaches πe,1.
We have shown that, despite the long-run price πe,2 being “closer” to the asset
fundamental value π = 1/2 than the long-run price πe,1, there are cases where prices
converge to the latter. In this example, the market is not informationally efficient.
It is not enough to have the “best” beliefs to dominate as preferences matter, too.
Finally, notice that if the agent with the best beliefs would be at least as risk adverse
as logarithmic preferences imply, or γ 1 ≥ 1, then informational efficiency would be
established again. The fact that a particular level of risk aversion is enough to recover
informational efficiency is not a general property though, as the next example shows.
5.2 Coexistence of unstable long-run market equilibria
Consider two agents with the same beliefs as in the previous example, i.e. πe,1 =
0.25 and πe,2 = 0.65, but with different risk preferences, γ 1 = 2 and γ 2 = 1.
9When performing simulations, we need to ensure that the market equilibrium is unique for all possible
wealth distribution, and not only when a single agent has all the wealth. For the rules the wealth dynamics
of which is plotted in Fig. 5 the result easily holds because their convex combination is always non-
increasing and thus has a unique interception with the EMC.
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Fig. 5 Simulations of the wealth dynamics for the market represented in the left panel of Fig. 4 with
initial condition w10 = 1/2 and two different realizations of ω. Left panel: agent 2 dominates. Right panel:
agent 1 dominates
Notice that agent 1 is still more risk averse than agent 2. The corresponding EMC
plot is depicted in the right panel of Fig. 4. Two single agent equilibria exist: U1,
where agent 1 dominates and prices are fixed at p = πe,1; and U2, where agent 2
dominates and prices are fixed at p = πe,2. Consider the relative distance of α1(p)
and α2 from the probability line π at these two prices. By graphical inspection, it can
be easily seen that rule α2 is closer to π at πe,1, the price set by rule α1, and rule
α1 is closer to π at πe,2, the price set by rule α2. Since the market rewards the rule
with the lowest relative entropy, that is, closest to the π line, agent 1 wealth share
increases, on average, when price, are near to those set by rule α2, that is, when the
latter is the rule with the larger wealth share. Conversely, agent 2 gains most wealth
when agent 1 has the larger wealth share.
Simulations of a generic wealth and price dynamics for this market10 are pre-
sented in the plots of Fig. 6. At the beginning, prices are close to πe,1, agent 2
is (on average) better-off and takes most wealth, thus driving prices close to πe,2,
where agent 1 is better-off, thus driving prices close to πe,1 and so on and so forth.
Both agents’ wealth keeps fluctuating indefinitely in the range (0, 1). Prices behave
accordingly and keep fluctuating in the interval (πe,1, πe,2), never converging to
the “best” beliefs. Prices and wealth fluctuations have an endogenous cause and do
not represent any change in market fundamentals, nor in agents’ preferences. From
the observation of Fig. 6 alone, believing that assets markets are able to set prices
according to the best available information, one would wrongly conclude that the
asset dividend process is non-stationary. It is true, however, that the long-run average
price seems close to the payoff payment probability π = 1/2. A precise characteri-
zation of how close would require the analysis of the global dynamics, which is not
performed here. Upon admitting that prices may have short-run persistent fluctua-
tions, due to agents heterogeneity in preferences and expectations, despite the lack of
10Also in this example, when performing simulations, we need to ensure that the market equilibrium is
unique for all possible wealth distribution and not only for the single survivor case. The result can be
established by looking at the first derivative of the convex combination of the two rules, which has limit
+∞ for p → 0, first decreasing and then increasing, and limit +∞ for p → 1. It follows that the convex
combination of the two rules cannot have more than one intercept with the EMC.
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Fig. 6 Price and wealth dynamics for the market represented in the right panel of Fig. 4. Left panel:
typical wealth dynamics. Right panel: typical price dynamics
market informational efficiency average prices do seem to deliver a not too incorrect
information in this example.
5.3 Some special rules
There exists an important price dependent rule that we have not considered because
it does not fall in the class of CRRA rules: holding the market portfolio. The market
portfolio rule corresponds to αM(p) = p, which coincides with the EMC line in a
EMC plot. This rule does not define an unique market equilibrium, in the sense that
it is consistent with all prices in (0, 1). No matter the realized states of Nature, it has
constant and unitary return, and thus constant wealth, as can be easily derived from
Eq. 2. Regarding market selection the market portfolio rule is special because, no
matter the rule used by competing agents, by adapting to prevailing prices it never
disappears.
Since α(p;πe, γ ) → p as γ → ∞, CRRA myopic maximizing agents approach
the market portfolio rule when the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases to
infinity (see the right panel of Fig. 3). Thus agents with high risk aversion have higher
chances of surviving in the long run. By contrast, agents with low risk aversion tend
to invest all the wealth in the under-priced asset (see the right panel of Fig. 3). This
behavior puts survivability at great risk in the sense that, resulting in a large relative
entropy for a large price range, exposes the agent at the risk of disappearing from
the market even when the beliefs of the competing agents are relatively far from the
truth.11
A particularly interesting question is to find the best performer, that is, the port-
folio rule that gains all wealth when trading against any other rule. In our context an
answer to this question is not available, as it would require performing the global mar-
ket dynamics analysis. However, it can be shown that the (log-optimal) Kelly rule,
i.e. to invest proportionally to the correct probabilities, has only stable fixed points
and destabilizes all other single survivor fixed points. In this sense, the Kelly rule is a
local champion, that is, the best performing rule in the neighborhoods of fixed points
11Even more in danger are risk neutral agents, or risk lovers, who, by investing all their wealth in the asset
with the highest expected payoff, would disappear from the market in finite time.
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where a single agent survives. When it is present in the market, prices do converge to
the informationally efficient level (π, 1 − π). Notice, however, that the Kelly rule is
not only characterized by the correctness of its beliefs but also by the precise struc-
ture of its preferences, corresponding to a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal
to one. As the previous examples show, the same beliefs with different preferences
may not grant informational efficiency. In any case, the Kelly rule may not be the
unique survivor.12
6 Rule ordering
In the previous section, we learned that the market may select different agents for dif-
ferent price ranges. In this section, we show the consequences of a price-dependent
selection on the possibility to order rules according to their relative market perfor-
mance. Ordering rules would be a desirable property in that it would allow us to
express an absolute judgment about their relative virtue. If the order relation “doing
better than”, meaning “gaining all wealth when trading with”, could be established,
transitivity would imply that, if rule α+ does better than rule α−, the same rule α+
would also do better than any other rule inferior to α−. Having an order relation
would thus allow for an ex-ante characterization of the asymptotic state of the market:
given an ecology composed of a collection of different trading rules, irrespectively
of their nature or number, it is only the best rules in the collection that will survive
and set prices in the long run.
In markets with constant rules, as those analyzed in Section 4, a natural relation
can be established using the relative entropy Iπ (α). We define rule α+ to be better
than rule α− when its relative entropy is lower or
α+  α− if and only if Iπ (α+) < Iπ(α−) . (17)
It is immediate to see that this relation is anti-reflexive and asymmetric. Since the
relative entropy is a concave function of its argument13, then if Iπ (α+) < Iπ(α0)
and Iπ (α0) < Iπ(α−), for any λ ∈ [0, 1], it holds
Iπ (λα
+ + (1 − λ)α0) ≤ λIπ (α+) + (1 − λ)Iπ (α0) < Iπ(α0) < Iπ(α−) .
In particular, Iπ (α+) < Iπ(α−), so that the relation defined in Eq. 17 is also transitive
and, hence, a (strict) order relation. Among constant rules, it thus makes sense to ask
which rule is the best, irrespectively of the specific rules trading in a given market.
Unfortunately, the possibility to build an order relation is lost when price dependent
rules are taken into account as, shown by the following example. Fix π = 1/2 and
consider the following three CRRA portfolio rules (also plotted in Fig. 7): rule one,
12Referring to the discussion in footnote 7, in the case of price dependent rules, it is log-optimality that
grants local dominance. In the context of price dependent rule and non-Arrow asset structures, the gener-
alized Kelly rule of Amir, Hens, Evstigneev, and Shenck-Hoppee`, i.e. investing proportionally to expected
payoff, is not log-optimal. Regarding both points see Section 5.1 of Bottazzi and Dindo (2010).
13It directly follows for the convexity of the log function.
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Fig. 7 EMC plot representing a market with π = 1/2 and the three rules considered in Section 6
α1(p), has πe,1 = 0.25 and γ 1 = 2; rule two, α2(p), has πe,2 = 0.3 and γ 2 = 1;
and rule three, α3(p), has πe,3 = 0.65 and γ 3 = 1.
When only α1(p) and α2(p) are trading, the price p is the unique14 solution of
pt = α1(pt ) w1t + α2(pt ) (1 − w1t ) ,
which is always between p = πe,1 = 0.25, when agent 1 has all the wealth, and
p = πe,2 = 0.3, when agent 2 has all the wealth. Since, for all realized prices,
i.e. prices between πe,1 and πe,2, rule α2 has a lower relative entropy than rule α1,
or Iπ (α
2(p)) < Iπ(α
3(p)) for all p ∈ [πe,1, πe,2], agent 2 dominates for every
initial condition: the wealth of the first agent converges to zero and prices converge
to πe,2 = 0.3. We can state that α2  α1 and the market is informationally efficient.
Compare now rule α2 and rule α3. When they are trading, the price p is in between
πe,2, when agent 2 has all the wealth, and πe,3, when agent 3 has all the wealth.
Since for all these prices agent 3 has a lower relative entropy, rule α3 dominates in
the long run and prices converge to πe,3 = 0.65. We can then state that α3  α1 and,
again, the market is informationally efficient.
Transitivity, necessary for  being a (strict) order relation, would now imply
α3  α1. When only α1 and α3 are trading the price is fixed between πe,1 and πe,3,
depending on the relative wealth size. Now, importantly, relative entropies Iπ (α3)
and Iπ (α1) do not have the same ranking for all realized prices, as can be appreciated
by comparing the relative distance from the probability line π in the plot of Fig. 7.
When rule 1 is close to having all wealth and the price of the first asset is close to
πe,1 it is Iπ (α3) < Iπ(α1). Otherwise, the opposite ranking occurs. As a result, local
stability analysis says that both fixed points where a rule dominates are unstable, so
that neither rule 1 nor rule 3 can ever be said to dominate. The proposition α3  α1 is
thus false, and upon introducing the relation ∼ by saying that two rule are equivalent
when none dominates, it holds that α3 ∼ α1.
14In all the examples of this section, uniqueness of the market equilibrium price can be established by
following the same reasoning presented in footnote 10.
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Fig. 8 Market with π = 1/2 and the three rules considered in Section 6. Left panel: wealth dynamics.
Right panel: prices dynamics
By using a counterexample, we have established that, among price-dependent
rules, relative dominance is not transitive and thus it does not define an order relation.
It is also interesting to analyze the market dynamics when all three rules are trading
in the same market. Market clearing prices are now functions of two wealth shares,
w1 for agent 1 and w2 for agent 2, since w3t = 1 − w1t − w2t . Since all fixed points
are locally unstable, as can be judged by comparing the relative distances to the Kelly
rule π in the EMC plot of Fig. 7, wealth fractions, and thus prices, keep fluctuating
(see also the right panel of Fig. 8). Again, the market cannot be said informational
efficient: despite rule α3 having the best information, the market fails to set prices
according to it.
7 Conclusion and open issues
We have discussed wealth-driven selection in a market for two Arrow securities using
a series of simple examples. When portfolio rules are constant, the rule with the low-
est relative entropy attracts all wealth in the long run, thus driving prices as close
as possible to asset fundamentals. This happens, for instance, when all agents max-
imize a CRRA expected utility with unitary relative risk aversion coefficient. The
picture changes when price dependent portfolio rules are considered, for instance,
when the coefficient of relative risk aversion of some traders is different from one. In
this broader case, wealth-driven selection works only locally, that is, for given prices,
and the market may not be able to select the rule that uses the best information.
In the context of market selection of profit maximizing firms, Nelson and Winter
(2002) argue that postulating the capability of markets to select for the global opti-
mum (investor in our context, firm in their) might open four possible issues. Our
examples show that the same issues play a role also in asset markets. The first issue
is variety: selection operates exclusively on the existing competing rules, so that if
the optimal rule is not trading in the market, it cannot possibly be selected. This
is obviously the case in the asset markets we consider, no matter whether rules are
price dependent or constant. The second issue is behavioral continuity: a rule that
is successful in period t is not necessarily successful in period t + 1, when market
conditions may have changed. This is precisely what happens in our example with
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two locally unstable fixed points, where each rule is the most successful at the prices
determined by the other. If, in a given period market, prices are close to the beliefs
of rule 1, then rule 2 is (on average) the most successful. The wealth share of the lat-
ter does, on average, increase and prices are brought close to its beliefs so that rule
1 becomes now the most successful. Hence behavioral continuity does not hold, no
rule is selected, and wealth shares and prices keep fluctuating indefinitely. Notice
that this contrasts with the outcome of a market in which only constant portfolio rules
are trading. In that case, the ranking induced by relative entropy holds for all mar-
ket conditions, hence implying behavioral continuity. The third issue is limited path
dependence, or the fact that there can be transient phases in which markets dynamics
eliminates “good” rules. This is precisely what happens when we have two locally
stable fixed points. Irrespectively of the ordering of long-run outcomes, wealth selec-
tion may drive the market towards either outcomes, depending on initial conditions
and/or specific realizations of states of Nature. As such, there exist cases in which
the best informed agent is driven out of the market in the transient. By the fourth
issue, profit-induced growth, it is meant that, even if a rule is earning wealth, it is
not granted that this wealth is in fact used to grow. This is equivalent to what hap-
pens when modeling traders with heterogeneous propensity to consume. We did not
discuss explicitly the issue in this paper, but since the more is consumed the less is
invested, a trade off between the quality of beliefs and the quantity of consumption
determines the local stability of long-run equilibria; see Bottazzi and Dindo (2010)
for more details. As these four main issues suggest, in general it is not possible to
order strategies according to their market performance and one cannot be sure of the
informational content of prices, as it is not granted that prices reflect the best available
information.
To conclude, the unknown part of the story is probably the largest and is composed
of many interrelated open questions. First, in this paper we have not dealt with any
form of learning, regarding neither the exogenous dividend process, nor endogenous
market prices. Both types of learning have been separately investigated. In order to
have stability, the former should be not too slow and the latter not too fast (see e.g.
Blume and Easley 2010; Bottazzi and Dindo 2010, respectively). Their joint inves-
tigation is however still missing. Second, one would like to consider also rules that
depend on wealth. This has both a behavioral relevance, as the individual wealth
level and its variation over time are natural indicators for the appropriateness of the
implemented rule, and a positive appeal, as it allows the study of market selection for
a broader class of risk preferences, e.g. constant absolute risk averse agents. Third,
further work is needed to characterize the global market dynamics. In more com-
plicated settings than the ones analyzed here, one cannot rely exclusively on local
stability results. Finally, an important new direction of investigation is the extension
of the present analysis to markets for long-lived assets. Whereas with constant rules
the message doesn’t change (see e.g. Evstigneev et al. 2009), it is not known what
happens when more general portfolio rules are considered.
Acknowledgments We acknowledge financial support from the Institute for New Economic Thinking,
INET inaugural grant #220 and the European Commission 6th FP Project DIME (Contract CIT3-CT-2005-
513396). All usual disclaimers apply.
Selection in asset markets: the good, the bad, and the unknown 661
References
Amir R, Evstigneev I, Hens T, Schenk-Hoppe´ K (2005) Market selection and survival of investment
strategies. J Math Econ 41:105–122
Anufriev M, Bottazzi G (2010) Market equilibria under procedural rationality. J Math Econ 46:1140–1172
Anufriev M, Dindo P (2010) Wealth-driven selection in a financial market with heterogeneous agents. J
Econ Behav Organ 73:327–358
Anufriev M, Bottazzi G, Pancotto F (2006) Equilibria, stability and asymptotic dominance in a speculative
market with heterogeneous agents. J Econ Dyn Control 30:1787–1835
Blume L, Easley D (1992) Evolution and market behavior. J Econ Theory 58:9–40
Blume L, Easley D (2006) If you are so smart why aren’t you rich? Belief selection in complete and
incomplete markets. Econometrica 74:929–966
Blume L, Easley D (2010) Heterogeneity, selection, and wealth dynamics. Ann Rev Econ 2:425–450
Bottazzi G, Dindo P (2010) Evolution and market behavior with endogenous investment rules. LEM
Working Paper 2010-20. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa
Breiman L (1961) Optimal gambling systems for favorable games. Proceedings of the 4th Berkley
symposium on mathematical statistics and probability 1:63–68
Evstigneev I, Hens T, Schenk-Hoppe´ K (2008) Globally evolutionary stable portfolio rules. J Econ Theory
140:197–228
Evstigneev I, Hens T, Schenk-Hoppe´ K (2009) Evolutionary finance. In: Hens T, Schenk-Hoppe´ K (eds)
Handbook of financial markets: dynamics and evolution. North-Holland (Handbooks in Economics
Series)
Hommes C (2006) Heterogeneous agent models in economics and finance. In: Judd K, Tesfatsion L (eds)
Handbook of computational economics, vol 2. Agent-based computational economics. North-Holland
Handbooks in Economics Series, Amsterdam
Kelly J (1956) A new interpretation of information rates. Bell Syst Tech J 35:917–926
LeBaron B (2006) Agent-based computational finance. In: Judd K, Tesfatsion L (eds) Handbook of com-
putational economics, vol 2. Agent-based computational economics. North-Holland (Handbooks in
Economics Series)
Nelson R, Winter S (2002) Evolutionary theorizing in economics. J Econ Perspect 16:23–46
Sandroni A (2000) Do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions. Econometrica 68(6):1303–
1341
Sandroni A (2005) Market selection when markets are incomplete. J Math Econ 41:91–104
